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The E¢ciency of Training and Hiring with Intrarm
Bargaining
Fabien Tripier
January 10, 2010
Abstract
In a matching and intrarm bargaining economy with constant return to scale production
and matching technologies, large rms hire and train workers e¢ciently. The e¢ciency of the
competitive economy relies on the ability of large rm to take into account the consequences of
training on the wages bargained inside the rm. This intrarm bargaining process solves the
hold-up problem that is associated with training costs that would otherwise lead to ine¢cient
decisions of hiring and training.
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1 Introduction
Imperfections in the labor market result in ine¢ciencies in decisions made by rms and workers that
call for public intervention and labor market regulations. Against this background, training decisions
have been widely studied. Training is a key determinant of labor market outcomes and is a¤ected
strongly by labor market imperfections, which give rise to hold-up phenomenon and externalities1.
To link the training decisions with the unemployment issue, the canonical matching model of the
labor market has been extended to study training decisions, rstly by Mortensen (2000), and later
by Higashi (2002), Boone and de Mooij (2003), Moen and Rosen (2004), Rosholm and Svarer (2004),
Chéron (2005), Shintoyo (2007), Hungerbühler (2007), Chéron et al. (2008), and Jansen (2009).
These models share the special assumption that a rm is composed of a single worker, which rules
out all the mechanisms that operate within the rm, such as the intrarm bargaining process for
the setting of wages that was proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, 1996b). In large rms, given
that wage bargaining is internal to the rm, the rm takes into account the consequences of its
organizational choices on wages. Herein, I analyze the normative implications of intrarm bargaining
on hiring and training decisions, which is absent by construction in the previously cited models of
matching and training, where rms comprise only a single job.
The implications of intrarm bargaining for hiring decisions have already been studied by Smith
(1999), Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), Cahuc et al. (2008), and Mortensen (2009) in di¤erent versions
of the matching model with large rms of Pissarides (2000). They show that intrarm bargaining
has strong normative and positive implications for equilibrium unemployment. In particular, the
traditional condition of Hosios2 (1990) is generally not su¢cient to ensure the e¢ciency of the
1Ericson (2005) provides an excellent survey of the economics of training. The issue of hold-up is studied by
Malcomson (1997), and the pecuniary and poaching externalities by Acemoglu (1997) and Acemgolu and Pischke
(1998).
2This condition states that the matching externalities are exactly internalized in the bargaining process for setting
wages if the bargaining power of rms (respectively workers) is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with
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decentralized economy. However, none of these articles deals with the training issue. In light of this,
I here develop an original model to analyze the training decision in a matching model of the labor
market that uses intrarm bargaining.
The model is populated by large rms who face matching frictions to hire workers and training
costs to train workers. Training is assumed to be purely specic, nanced by the rm, and given
to workers who have already been hired by the rm. Workers are rstly hired and then (perhaps)
trained according to the rms decision. In this context, there are two types of workers in the rms:
the trained and the untrained. To analyze the consequences of intrarm bargaining, the model is
solved under two alternative assumptions with regard to the wage bargaining process3.
 Under the rst assumption, the wage bargaining process is treated as external to rms: a rm
does not take into account the consequences of its hiring and training decisions for the wages
bargained with its workers. This bargaining process is referred to an extrarm bargaining
process.
 Under the second assumption, the wage bargaining process is treated as internal to rms: a rm
takes into account the consequences of its hiring and training decisions for the wages bargained
with its workers. This bargaining process is referred to an intrarm bargaining process.
The rst assumption leads to ine¢cient training and hiring decisions by rms, for two reasons.
Firstly, when a rm has paid the xed cost of training, the worker can capture a share of the surplus,
without having paid for it. This is the well-known phenomenon of hold-up, which arises in the
context of imperfect labor markets and xed costs. Secondly, and following from the rst point, if
trained workers can hold up the rm, untrained workers will accept, in compensation for potential
training that is accessible only following employment, wages that are too low. This second problem
respect to the mass vacant jobs (respectively unemployed workers).
3Krause and Lubik (2007) proceed similarly to assess the importance of intrarm bargaining for the behavior of
the matching model with respect to the business cycle.
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worsens the ine¢ciency of training decision. Firms have insu¢cient motivation to invest in training
and prefer to keep too many workers untrained, whose wages are excessively low compared with the
wages of trained workers. The consequences for employment are ambiguous. There can be over or
under-employment. However, there can generally no e¢cient employment even if the condition of
Hosios (1990) applies.
I show that the rms decisions become e¢cient under the second assumption. By using the
intrarm bargaining process on wages, rms take into account the negative impact of training on the
wages of untrained workers. Training workers not only improves the e¢ciency of production; it also
reduces the wage of untrained workers. Compared with the case of extrarm bargaining, taking this
payo¤ into account leads rms to increase their hiring e¤ort up to the optimal level. The condition
of Hosios (1990) is then su¢cient to guarantee the e¢ciency of hiring. It is worth mentioning that
competitive e¢ciency is achieved with wage inequality between trained and untrained workers even
if training is specic and paid only by the rms.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the processes of
matching, training, and production. Section 3 presents the optimal equilibrium as the solution of the
social planners problem. The competitive equilibrium is introduced in Section 4 and its e¢ciency
properties analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Matching, training, and production
The nal good y is produced with two labor inputs: that of untrained workers, u, and that of trained
workers, t, according to y = f (u; t), where the production technology f (; ) is continuous, twice
di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave in both arguments. Training is specic to rms, which means
that all new hired workers are untrained because rms cannot hire trained workers. In addition, I
assume that rms cannot simultaneously hire and train a worker. Training must follow hiring.
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The law of motion of the mass of untrained workers is
u0 = (1   ) u  u+  (v; s) (1)
where u0 is the next period mass of untrained workers,  is the exogenous rate of job destruction,
(u) is the ow of workers trained with  the training rate, and  (v; s) is the ow of new hires.
This ow is the outcome of the matching process on the labor market and given by the matching
technology  (v; s), where v is the vacant job supply by rms and s = (1  u  t) denotes the mass of
unemployed workers (the population size is normalized to the unity). There is no on-the-job search;
only unemployed workers can search for a job. The matching technology  (v; s) is continuous, twice
di¤erentiable, increasing, and concave in both arguments. The matching probabilities are denoted
by p () for workers and q () for vacancies, with  = v=s being the labor market tightness.
The law of motion of the mass of trained workers is
t0 = (1   ) t+ u (2)
where t0 is the next period mass of trained workers, (1   ) is the survival rate of jobs to the
obsolescence process, and (u) the ow of new trained workers. The nal good market equilibrium
is
y + sb = c+ hu+ dv (3)
where y is the nal good production by rms, b is the home production of nal good per unemployed
worker, c is the consumption, (hu) the amount spent on training (with h the training cost per
worker), and dv the amount spent on searching the labor market (with d the per period search cost
for a vacancy).
Lemma 1 Any steady-state equilibrium satises the three following steady-state constraints
u+ t = p () = [ + p ()] (4)
 t = u (5)
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f (u; t) + (1  t  u) b = c+ hu+ d (1  t  u) (6)
which are deduced from equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
Equation (4) determines the employment rate in the economy (u+ t) as a function of the hiring
rate, p () ; and the job destruction rate,  . To ensure the constancy of the mass of trained workers,
the ows of trained workers displaced ( t) and of untrained workers trained (u) are equal; see
Equation (5). The ratio of trained workers to untrained workers (t=u) is then equal to the ratio of
the training rate to the job destruction rate (= ) : Equation (6) re-expresses the market equilibrium
condition for the nal good given by Equation (3) with the masses of workers, the consumption, the
training rate, and the labor market tightness.
3 The social optimum
The e¢cient allocation is the outcome of the the social planners program. Households preferences
are dened by the subjective discount rate, ; and a linear utility function with respect to the
consumption. Then, the maximization problem of the social planner is characterized by the following
value function:
P (u; t) = max
fv;;u0;t0g
ff (u; t) + (1  t  u) b  hu  dv + P (u0; t0)g (7)
 u [u0   (1   ) u+ u   (v; 1  u  t)]  t [t0   (1   ) t  u]
with t0 > 0 and u0 > 0 the initial conditions of the state variables. The rst-order condition with
respect to the mass of vacant jobs, v; gives
d = 
1
(v; 1  u  t) u (8)
the marginal cost of a vacancy, d, is equal to its marginal contribution in the matching process,

1
(v; s), times the value of the marginal untrained worker, u. The rst-order condition with respect
6
to the training e¤ort, ; is
h = t   u (9)
the marginal cost of training, h; is equal to the di¤erence between the values of the marginal trained
worker and the marginal untrained worker, t   u.
The rst-order condition with respect to the next period mass of untrained workers, u0; is
u = P1 (u
0; t0) (10)
The envelop condition, with Equation (8), gives
d

1
(v; 1  u  t)
= 

f1 (u
0; t0)  b  d

2
(v0; 1  u0   t0)

1
(v0; 1  u0   t0)
+ (1   )
d

1
(v0; 1  u0   t0)

(11)
The RHS of (11) is the contribution of the marginal untrained worker to the tomorrow value function.
This is composed of three terms: (i) the di¤erential of the marginal productivity of untrained workers
in the production sector, f1 (u
0; t0) ; and of the constant marginal productivity of these workers in the
home production sector, b; (ii) the search cost, d; multiplied by the ratio of the marginal productivity
in the matching function of unemployed workers, 
2
(), and of vacant jobs, 
1
() ; and (iii) the
survival rate of job, (1   ) ; times the contribution of the marginal untrained worker to the value
function.
The rst-order condition with respect to the mass of trained workers, t0; is
t = P1 (u
0; t0) (12)
The envelop condition, with Equation (9), gives
d

1
(v; 1  u  t)
+ h = 

f2 (u
0; t0)  b  d

2
(v0; 1  u0   t0)

1
(v0; 1  u0   t0)
+ (1   )

d

1
(v0; 1  u0   t0)
+ h

(13)
The di¤erences between Equations (13) and (11) yield (i) the denition of the marginal productivity
of workers, f2 (u
0; t0) instead of f1 (u
0; t0), and (ii) the denition of the marginal contribution of workers
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to the current value function, (d=
1
() + h) instead of d=
1
() : The marginal productivity of trained
workers is higher than for untrained workers, but these workers have an additional cost, h.
Lemma 2 The social planners rules for training and hiring are in the steady state:

d

1
(v; s)
= f1 (u; t)  b  d

2
(v; s)

1
(v; s)
(14)
h = f2 (u; t)  f1 (u; t) (15)
where  =
 
 1   (1   )

.
These two Equations (14) and (15) are deduced from Equations (11) and (13). Training and
hiring costs are discounted by the rate ; which combines the intertemporal discounting of household
() and the survival rate of jobs (1   ). The social planner equalizes the marginal cost of training
(discounted by ) to the net surplus of training measured by the di¤erence between the marginal
productivities of trained and untrained workers.
Denition 1 The steady-state e¢cient allocation is dened by the set of endogenous variables bY =nbu;bt;b; b;bco that solve the equilibrium constraints (4)-(5)-(6) and the rules of hiring and training
(14)-(15).
4 The competitive economy
To dene the competitive economy, I rst introduce the rms problem and then solve the wage
bargaining process.
4.1 The Firms Value Function
At each period, the representative rm bargains the wages with all the workers in the rm, decides
the number of vacancies posted on the labor market, and chooses the fraction of untrained workers
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to train. The bargained wages are functions of the rms masses of workers and of the rms training
rate: wu (u; t; ) for untrained workers and wt (u; t; ) for trained workers. Other variables, such
as the unemployed hiring rate, inuence the wages, but they do not directly depend on the rms
decision and are consequently not introduced in the bargained wage functions.
The maximization problem of the representative rm is characterized by the following value
function:
F (u; t) = max
fv;;u0;t0g

f (u; t)  wu (u; t; ) u  wt (u; t; ) t  hu  dv + F (u0; t0)
	
(16)
 u [u0   (1   ) u+ u  q () v]  t [t0   (1   ) t  u]
with t0 > 0 and u0 > 0 the initial conditions of the state variables. The rst-order condition with
respect to the mass of vacant jobs v gives
d = q () u (17)
the marginal cost of a vacancy, d, is equal to its matching probability, q (), times the value of the
marginal untrained worker, u. The rst-order condition with respect to the hiring rate  is
h = t   u  

wu
3
(u; t; ) u+ wt
3
(u; t; ) t

=u (18)
the marginal cost of training, h; is equal to the di¤erence between the values of the marginal trained
worker and the marginal untrained worker,
 
t   u

, less the adjustment of wages in the rm
weighted by the masses of workers, that is, wx
3
(u; t; ) x for x = u; t.
The values of the worker for the rm are given by
F1 (u; t) = [f1 (u; t)  w
u (u; t; )] 

wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t

+ (1   ) u (19)
+
 
t   u   h

for an untrained worker and by
F2 (u; t) =

f2 (u; t)  w
t (u; t; )

 

wu
2
(u; t; ) u+ wt
2
(u; t; ) t

+ (1   ) t (20)
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for a trained worker. The two functions are composed of similar elements. The rst term in brackets
is the di¤erence between the marginal productivity of the worker and his wage. The second term in
brackets accounts for the e¤ect of the marginal worker on the bargaining wage functions weighted by
the masses of workers. The third term is the discount value of the marginal worker, which survives to
the exogenous destruction process. The probability that the job is not destroyed is (1   ) and the
rm conserves the value of the marginal worker. Finally, there is an additional term that is specic
to the untrained worker. The probability that the worker is trained and the rm get the net payo¤
of training is  in Equation (19). This value is equal to the value of the marginal trained worker
(t), less the value of the marginal untrained worker (u), and less the training cost (h).
The rst-order conditions with respect to the state variables u0 and t0 are
u = F1 (u
0; t0) (21)
t = F2 (u
0; t0) (22)
where the expression for F1 (u
0; t0) and F2 (u
0; t0) are given by (19) and (20), respectively.
Lemma 3 The competitive rms rules of training and hiring are at the steady state:

d
q ()
= f1 (u; t)  w
u (u; t; ) 

wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t

(23)
+

wu
3
(u; t; ) + wt
3
(u; t; )
t
u

f2 (u; t)  f1 (u; t) = 
h+

wt (u; t; )  wu (u; t; )

(24)
+

wu
2
(u; t; ) u+ wt
2
(u; t; ) t

 

wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t

+( + )

wu
3
(u; t; ) + wt
3
(u; t; )
t
u

which are deduced from Equations (19)-(20)-(21)-(22).
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4.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
The Nash bargaining solution assumes that each worker, whatever his training level, behaves as the
marginal worker and bargains his wage directly with the rm at each period. The untrained and
trained worker wages satisfy the following Nash solutions:
 (Wu   U) = (1  )F1 (u; t) (25)
 (Wt   U) = (1  )F2 (u; t) (26)
where  is the bargaining power of workers, Wu (respectively Wt) is the value function of being
matched for an untrained (respectively trained) worker and U is the value function of being unem-
ployed. These value functions are dened as follows:
Wu = w
u (u; t; ) + (1     ) W 0u + W
0
t +  U
0 (27)
Wt = w
t (u; t; ) + (1   ) W 0t +  U
0 (28)
U = b+ p () W 0u + (1  p ()) U
0 (29)
An untrained worker earns the wage wu (u; t; ) and keeps his job with probability (1     ); in
this case, he gets W 0u. The probability that this worker is trained and then gets the discounted value
of being trained and matched at the next period, W 0t, is . Finally, the probability that the job is
destroyed and the worker gets the discounted value of being unmatched at the next period, U 0, is
 . A trained worker earns the wage wt (u; t; ) and keeps his job with probability (1   ); otherwise,
the job is destroyed and the worker returns to the labor market as unemployed. Unemployed workers
earn b as home production and face a probability p () of matching.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium wage functions solve a two-dimension system of partial derivative equa-
tions, given by
wu (u; t; ) + (1  )

wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t

= b+ (1  ) [f1 (u; t) + d]  (1  )h (30)
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wt (u; t; ) + (1  )

wu
2
(u; t; ) u+ wt
2
(u; t; ) t

= b+ (1  ) [f2 (u; t) + d] (31)
The wage premium for trained workers is
wt (u; t; )  wu (u; t; ) = (1  ) [f2 (u; t)  f1 (u; t) + h] (32)
+(1  )

wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t  wu
2
(u; t; ) u  wt
2
(u; t; ) t

See appendix A.1 for details of the calculus.
5 E¢ciency of the competitive equilibrium
The e¢ciency of the competitive equilibrium is solved under several assumptions that reduce the
variety of distortions in the economy. I rst give a formal denition of the competitive equilibrium.
Denition 2 The steady-state competitive allocation is dened by the set of endogenous variables
eY = neu;et;e; e;eco and the wage functions wu  eu;et; e and wt  eu;et; e that solve the equilibrium
constraints (4)-(5)-(6), the rms rules for training and hiring (23)-(24), and the Nash Bargaining
solutions for the wages (30)- (31).
5.1 Assumptions
The analysis of the e¢ciency of the competitive equilibrium is done under the following three as-
sumptions.
A1 The matching function is a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale:  (v; s) =
vs1 ; with 0 <  < 1;  > 0, 
1
(v; s) =  1; and 
2
(v; s) = (1  ).
A2 The bargaining power of workers is equal to the elasticity parameter of the matching technology
with respect to unemployed workers  = :
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A3 The production function is a Cobb-Douglas technology with constant return to scale: f (u; t) =
u1 t, with 0 <  < 1; f1 (u; t) = (1  ) (t=u)
, and f2 (u; t) =  (t=u)
 1
These assumptions rule out several sources of ine¢ciency to focus on the issue of rm-specic
training in large rms. Assumption 1 rules out the possibilities of multiple equilibria or complex
dynamics induced by increasing returns to scale in the matching function; see Mortensen (1999).
Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that externalities in the matching process are internalized in the wage
bargaining process, as has been well known following Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000). Assump-
tion 3 rules out the case of strategic overemployment by rms that was pointed out by Smith (1999)
and Cahuc et al. (2008), when returns to scale in the production function are non-constant.
Under Assumptions A1-A3, some key equilibrium relations can be simplied as follows. The
wage functions wu (u; t; ) and wt (u; t; ) solutions of (30) and (31) are now
wu (u; t; ) = b+ (1  ) d + (1  ) (1  ) (b= )   (1  )h (33)
wt (u; t; ) = b+ (1  ) d + (1  )   1b 1 (34)
Both wage functions have the same two rst terms and are increasing with the home productions
productivity (b) and the labor market tightness (). The ratio of trained workers to untrained
workers (equal to = ) has the following consequences for wages. Increasing the training e¤ort ()
diminishes the marginal productivity of trained workers (and then their wage wt (u; t; )), whereas
it increases the marginal productivity of untrained workers (and then their wage wu (u; t; )). For
untrained workers, there is an additional term,   (1  )h: Being matched gives untrained workers
an opportunity to access a training program. This opportunity weakens the threat point of workers
and lowers the wage.
The optimal training rate b and the labor market tightness b solutions of (14)-(15) solve
 (b= ) 1   (1  ) (b= ) = h (35)
13

d

b1  =  [(1  ) (b= )   b]  (1  ) db (36)
given (t=u) = = ; see Equation (5). Equation (35) gives the implicit expression of b as a function
of parameters  = f;  ; 
; hg. Equation (36) gives the implicit expression of b as a function of
the value b and the parameters  = f; d; ; ; bg. The labor market tightness depends positively
on the hiring rate, because training improves the marginal productivity of newly hired workers.
5.2 Wage structure and e¢ciency
To analyze the e¢ciency of hiring and training by competitive rms, I proceed in two steps.
 First, I solve the wage bargaining process, without taking into account the intrarm dimension
of the problem. This corresponds to the extrarm bargaining process. Each rm neglects the
consequences of its hiring and training decisions for the wages bargained inside this rm. The
corresponding wages lead to suboptimal hiring and training e¤orts.
 Afterwards, I solve the complete wage bargaining process, taking into account the intrarm
dimension of the problem. I show that the intrarm bargaining process solves the problems
identied in the rst step and leads to rms making e¢cient hiring and training decisions.
Proposition 1 Without intrarm bargaining, rms do not hire and train workers e¢ciently. The
competitive training rate is below the optimal training rate and the competitive labor market tightness
can be either above or below the optimal value.
Proof. With extrarm bargaining, the partial derivatives of wage functions with respect to the
rms variable decisions are null: wui (u; t; ) = 0 and w
u
i (u; t; ) = 0 for i = 1; 2; 3, and the rms
rules for training and hiring, which are dened by Equations (23) and (24), become

d
q ()
= f1 (u; t)  w
u (u; t; ) (37)
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f2 (u; t)  f1 (u; t) = 
h+ wt (u; t; )  wu (u; t; ) (38)
where the wage wu (u; t; ) is given by Equation (33) and the wage premium for trained workers,
deduced directly from Equation (32), is
wt (u; t; )  wu (u; t; ) = (1  ) [h+ f2 (u; t)  f1 (u; t)] (39)
Let x denote the equilibrium value of x in the competitive economy without intrarm bargaining. The
competitive training rate  and labor market tightness  are the solutions of
(1  )h+ h

=  (= ) 1   (1  ) (= ) (40)

d


1 
+ (1  ) d =  [(1  ) (= )   b] + (1  )h (41)
The condition  < b of insu¢cient competitive training is always satised, because  >  . The
condition of excessive competitive hiring  > b requires
(1  )h >  (1  )   (b   )
With extrarm bargaining, two distortions create ine¢ciency in the competitive economy. The
rst distortion is the presence of the term (1  )h in Equation (41), which is absent in its counter-
part in the planned economy, Equation (36). Being matched gives untrained workers an opportunity
to access a training program. This opportunity weakens the threat point of workers and lowers the
wage. Due to the fact that untrained workers receive low wages, rms hire too many workers (for a
xed value of the untrained marginal productivity f1 (u; t)).
The second distortion is the evaluation of the cost of training h by the rms in the competitive
economy (see Equation (40)) and h by the social planner (see Equation (35)). For a xed value of
the labor market tightness, , this distortion leads to insu¢cient training in the competitive economy.
The trained workers appropriate a share of the marginal productivity of trained workers, which is
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higher than the marginal productivity of untrained workers. This corresponds to the well-known
hold-up phenomenon, which is induced here by the specic training costs. This distortion is the
second component of the wage premium dened in (39).
Proposition 2 With intrarm bargaining, rms hire and train workers e¢ciently.
Proof. Let ex denote the equilibrium value of x in the competitive economy without intrarm
bargaining. The wage functions wu
 eu;et; e and wt  eu;et; e given by (33) and (34) imply
wu
3
 eu;et; e =   (1  )h (42)
wt
3
 eu;et; e = 0 (43)
The rms rule for training that is dened by Equation (24) is then
 (e= ) 1   (1  ) (e= ) = h+ wt  eu;et; e  wu  eu;et; e  (e + ) (1  )h (44)
Given the wage premium, which is still given by Equation (32), Equation (44) becomes
 (e= ) 1 (1  ) (e= ) = h+(1  ) eh+  (e= ) 1   (1  ) (e= ) ( + ) (1  )h = h
(45)
which is equivalent to the optimal rule for training dened by Equation (35). The rms rule for
hiring, dened by Equations (23), is then

d

e1  = (1  ) (e= )   wu  eu;et; e  ea (1  )h (46)
=  [(1  ) (e= )   b]  (1  ) d (47)
which is equivalent to the optimal rule for training dened by Equation (36), because  =  (see
assumption A2).
As the training rate  increases, the wage of untrained workers decreases. However, the increase
in  has no direct e¤ect on the wage of trained workers. An increase in  increases the probability
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of being trained in the rm; consequently, the threat point of untrained workers is weaker and their
wages lower. Intrarm bargaining creates a gain to the rm that is derived from specic training
decisions, which modies the training and hiring decisions. This wage gain is equal to   (1  )h,
see Equation (42), and appears rstly in the RHS term of Equation (44). This term measures the
total cost of training, which is reduced as a result of the wage gain of training. Remember that
without intrarm bargaining, training is insu¢cient. By reducing the total cost of training, the
intrarm bargaining stimulates training and then improves the e¢ciency of the labor market. It
is worth mentioning that the term (1  )h appears in the denition of the wage premium given
by Equation (32). Equation (45) shows how these terms nullify each other, thereby leading to an
e¢cient competitive training rule.
The wage gain of training appears for a second time in the RHS term of Equation (46). This
term measures the total payo¤ of hiring, which is equal to the expected value of an untrained worker.
With intrarm bargaining, the marginal untrained worker has a specic opportunity cost, which is
equal to the fall in untrained wage that the rm would obtain if it were to train the worker. This
opportunity cost diminishes the value of the marginal untrained for the rm and then improves the
e¢ciency of hiring. Indeed, without intrarm bargaining, untrained wages are too low. Here, given
that the opportunity cost is taken into account by rms, hiring is e¢cient.
In sum, the intrarm bargaining mechanism corrects the two distortions that were identied as
occurring when the bargaining for wages is extrarm. The e¢ciency of hiring and training decisions
is reached when there is a wage inequality between trained and untrained workers. Note that wage
inequality is not a generally necessary condition of e¢ciency. However, it is a necessary condition in
the specic context of a decentralized, repeated, and individual wage bargaining process. I show in
appendix A.2 that there exists an unique wage level for all workers that would lead to e¢ciency if
this wage was imposed exogenously on competitive rms. However, this wage is not consistent with
a Nash bargaining process, except when workers are assumed not to take into account the increase
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of their marginal productivity after they are trained.
6 Conclusion
I have developed a model to assess the consequences of intrarm bargaining on decisions regarding
hiring and training and the e¢ciency of the labor market. The imperfections in the labor market
are potentially responsible for ine¢ciency in the labor market, because the trained workers are able
to hold up rms to obtain higher wages and the untrained workers accept low wages in return for
potential training. Without intrarm bargaining, rms underinvest in training and may either under-
or over-hire workers. With intrarm bargaining, rms internalize the specic benet from training
through the fall in wages of untrained workers. This benet leads rms to hire and train workers
e¢ciently. This conclusion shows the importance of the internal dimension of the rms choices for
assessing the consequences of imperfections in the labor market.
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A Appendix
A.1 The wage functions
This appendix provides details of the calculus that are useful for obtaining the key equations that
are reported for the wage functions. The surpluses for matched workers are
Wu   U = w
u (u; t; )  b+ (1       p) (W 0u   U
0) +  (W 0t   U
0) (A.1)
Wt   U = w
t (u; t; )  b+ (1   ) (W 0t   U
0)  p (W 0u   U
0) (A.2)
for untrained and trained workers, respectively. To solve the Nash Bargaining program, the FOCs
rm (21)-(22) are used to express the expected surplus of workers as function of the contribution of
marginal workers to the rms value function
 (W 0u   U
0) =

1  


F1 (u
0; t0) =

1  


u (A.3)
 (W 0t   U
0) =

1  


F2 (u
0; t0) =

1  


t (A.4)
Then, the surplus (A.1)-(A.2) become
Wu   U = w
u (u; t; )  b+ (1       p)

1  


u + 

1  


t
Wt   U = w
t (u; t; )  b+ (1   )

1  


t   p

1  


u
For f (u; t) = uutt, the wage functions solution of (30) and (31) are
wu (u; t; ) = b+ (1  )

u
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uu 1tt + d   h

(A.5)
wt (u; t; ) = b+ (1  )

t
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uutt 1 + d

(A.6)
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The rst order partial derivatives of the wage functions are
wu
3
(u; t; ) =   (1  )h (A.7)
wt
3
(u; t; ) = 0 (A.8)
wu
1
(u; t; ) = (1  )
u (u   1)
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uu 2tt (A.9)
wu
2
(u; t; ) = (1  )
ut
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uu 1tt 1 (A.10)
wt
1
(u; t; ) = (1  )
tu
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uu 1tt 1 (A.11)
wt
2
(u; t; ) = (1  )
t (t   1)
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uutt 2 (A.12)
with
wu
1
(u; t; ) u+ wt
1
(u; t; ) t = (1  )
u (u   1) + tu
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uu 1tt (A.13)
wu
2
(u; t; ) u+ wt
2
(u; t; ) t = (1  )
ut + t (t   1)
1  (1  ) (1  u   t)
uutt 1 (A.14)
The assumption A3 (t =  and u = 1  ) implies
u (u   1) + tu = ut + t (t   1) = 0 (A.15)
and
wu
1
(u; t; ) =   (1  ) (1  ) u  1t (A.16)
wu
2
(u; t; ) = (1  ) (1  ) u  t 1 (A.17)
wt
1
(u; t; ) = (1  ) (1  ) u tt 1 (A.18)
wt
2
(u; t; ) =   (1  ) (1  ) u1 tt 2 (A.19)
A.2 E¢ciency without wage inequality
The intrarm bargaining leads to e¢cient hiring and training decisions of rms, with wage inequality
between trained and untrained workers on the labor market. It is worth mentioning that in the
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context of individual Nash bargaining on wages, the wage premium is a necessary condition of
e¢ciency. The next proposition states that there exists a wage structure without wage inequality
that is consistent with e¢cient decisions of rms, but that cannot be reached by Nash bargaining.
Proposition 3 There exists a structure of wages that ensures the e¢ciency of hiring and training
by competitive rms without a wage premium for trained workers.
Proof. For wt (u; t; ) = wu (u; t; ) = b + (1  ) [f1 (u; t) + d]  w
, the competitive rules
for hiring and training (23) and (24) are equivalent to the e¢cient rules dened by (14) and (15).
Firstly, without wage inequality, the competitive gap in worker marginal productivity dened
by Equation (24) is equal to h, which is the value used by the social planner. Consequently, the
ratio of trained to untrained workers decided by rms is optimal. Secondly, the wage w ensures the
optimality of the hiring policy by rms, dened by Equation (23), because matching externality is
exactly internalized in the wage under the condition of Hosios (1990).
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